URGENT
ALERT! TAKE ACTION NOW!
STOP SMALLPOX GENETIC ENGINEERING!
4 April 2005
Please take action
now to stop smallpox genetic engineering!
Visit www.smallpoxbiosafety.org
to send a letter to the WHO Director General, urging the World
Health Assembly to reject a proposal that would permit the genetic
engineering of smallpox, and to instead ensure that all remaining
stocks of the virus are destroyed within two years.
The proposal to genetically engineer smallpox, which would also
permit smallpox genes to be inserted into related poxviruses and
the unlimited distribution of small segments of smallpox DNA,
poses a large number of public health, biosafety, and biological
weapons risks.
The World Health Assembly will discuss the proposal when it meets
in Geneva, Switzerland from 6-25 May 2005.
Every letter counts, so please send one today. This is very easily
done by going to www.smallpoxbiosafety.org, selecting your language
of preference, entering the required details, and clicking on
the ‘submit’ button.
Please also contact your government’s representatives to
the WHA. The website provides links to national health ministries.
The website is available in Chinese, English, French, German,
Italian, and Spanish.
Attached are the press release and some background information
in English and French.
With best wishes,
Third World Network
121-S Jalan Utama
10450 Penang
Malaysia
Email: twnet@po.jaring.my
Press Release
The Sunshine Project
Third World Network
http://smallpoxbiosafety.org
This text is also available in:
Chinese: http://smallpoxbiosafety.org/who/prchinese.html
French: http://smallpoxbiosafety.org/who/prfrench.html
German: http://smallpoxbiosafety.org/who/prgerman.html
Italian: http://smallpoxbiosafety.org/who/pritalian.html
Spanish: http://smallpoxbiosafety.org/who/prspanish.html
International Campaign to Stop Smallpox Genetic Engineering Announced
Non-Governmental Organizations Urge the World Health Organization
to Put Smallpox in the History Books Instead of the Genetic Engineering
Lab
(4 April 2005) – An international alliance of non-governmental
organizations has launched a campaign to urge the World Health
Organization to reject a proposal that would permit the genetic
engineering of smallpox and to instead ensure that all remaining
stocks of the virus are destroyed within two years. Debate on
the proposal will take place at the World Health Assembly (WHA),
which meets in Geneva, Switzerland beginning on May 16th.
The NGOs, led by Third World Network and The Sunshine Project,
have opened a website, www.smallpoxbiosafety.org, where organizations
and individuals can send letters to the WHO Director General.
The website provides links to health ministries, so that people
can also contact their government’s representatives to the
WHA. The website is available in Chinese, English, French, German,
Italian, and Spanish.
The proposal to genetically engineer smallpox, which would also
permit smallpox genes to be inserted into related poxviruses and
the unlimited distribution of small segments of smallpox DNA,
poses a large number of public health, biosafety, and biological
weapons risks. It was prompted by the United States, and has been
recommended to the WHA through an imbalanced advisory committee.
A Briefing Paper (The Genetic Engineering of Smallpox: WHO’s
Retreat from the Eradication of Smallpox Virus and Why it Should
be Stopped) at the website explains the political process that
led to the proposal, the risks, and why it should be rejected.
An edited excerpt from the paper that provides more background
is appended to this news release.
Between now and the May opening of the WHA, the NGOs will be seeking
to mobilize a wide variety of non-governmental organization and
citizens. They will contact all member governments of WHO and
urge them to reject the committee’s recommendations and
to instead:
* Prohibit the genetic engineering of smallpox, the insertion
of smallpox genes in other poxviruses, and any further distribution
of smallpox genetic material for non-diagnostic purposes;
* Set a firm and irrevocable date, within two years, for the destruction
of all remaining stocks of smallpox virus (including viral chimeras,
or hybrids with other poxviruses);
* In the interim before destruction, ensure that the WHO Advisory
Committee on Variola Virus Research and its advisors are regionally
balanced and that the Committee and its subsidiary groups conduct
their oversight activities in a fully transparent and accountable
manner.
Interested organizations and people are urged to visit www.smallpoxbiosafety.org
to learn more about this issue and to send a letter to the WHO
Director General.
Contacts:
Third World Network The Sunshine Project
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Austin, Texas, US
Tel: + 603-2300 2585 Tel: +1 512 494 0545
E-mail: twnkl@po.jaring.my E-mail: tsp@sunshine-project.org
GMT + 7 GMT -6
Background
The World Health Organization (WHO) is justly proud of the global
effort that brought about the eradication of smallpox in 1977;
but the truth of the matter is that the job was never finished.
The United States and Russia still retain stocks of the smallpox
virus (Variola major), an easily transmitted disease and ancient
scourge of humanity that is a potent biological weapons agent.
Smallpox kills one quarter or more of the people it infects and
leaves many that do not die disfigured and blind.
In 1999, the remaining stocks of smallpox virus were slated for
imminent destruction. But Russia and the US balked at the World
Health Assembly (WHA) resolution calling upon them to destroy
the virus. Instead, the US has accelerated smallpox research.
Now, it wants to open the Pandora’s Box of genetically-engineered
smallpox. A plan to genetically engineer the virus could be approved
by the World Health Assembly in May 2005. The plan also includes
the expression of smallpox genes in related poxviruses, and unlimited
distribution of segments of smallpox DNA. If implemented, this
plan would pose serious biosafety risks and open the road to an
artificial reconstruction of the virus for biowarfare purposes.
Fewer and fewer people, and their leaders, have personal memories
of the horror of smallpox, or even the scars left by vaccination,
which had ended in most countries by the late 1970s. As if the
world is condemned to repeat history through forgetfulness, WHO
has now lost the political will that it once had to finish the
job of smallpox eradication. Much of the blame can be laid at
the feet of WHO’s decision to leave oversight of smallpox
research in the hands of an unbalanced and highly politicized
“technical” advisory committee that is dominated by
a small number of countries and scientists with a personal interest
in pursuing smallpox research. It was US pressure that rammed
the proposal for genetically-engineered smallpox through that
committee, and now the World Health Assembly is in an inglorious
position of being on the verge of endorsing what may prove to
be the undoing of one its own greatest achievements.
Civil society and like-minded governments must urgently come together
to turn the tide. The creation of genetically-engineered smallpox
and hybrids of smallpox and other viruses (called chimera) pose
serious public health, biosafety, and biological weapons dangers
to the entire world. With increased smallpox experimentation,
the world stands closer to the accident or deliberate act that
would cause a release of the virus.
Because many poxviruses are closely-related to each other and,
in their natural state frequently not entirely species-specific,
the insertion of smallpox genes in related viruses has the potential
to create dangerous new human (and animal) pathogens. Through
genetic engineering or targeted mutations, labs that receive pieces
of the smallpox genome may develop the ability to create smallpox
or a novel virus with its characteristics without ever receiving
an actual sample of Variola major. Moreover, laboratory safety
practices and technology cannot erase human error and equipment
failures that lead to accidents, as evidenced by a recent string
of lab-acquired infections and environmental releases of SARS,
Ebola, tularemia, and other dangerous diseases. In fact, the last
reported human cases of smallpox were laboratory-acquired (see
page 3 of the Briefing Paper - The Genetic Engineering of Smallpox:
WHO’s Retreat from the Eradication of Smallpox Virus and
Why it Should be Stopped).
Contained to only two labs in Russia and the US, smallpox has
a unique multilateral research oversight structure that has no
parallel with any other disease. Because of the unique situation
of smallpox research, if WHO approves these experiments it will
not only increase the threat posed by smallpox itself. WHO will
also broadcast the signal that it is internationally acceptable
to have genetic engineering of other germs, including experiments
in which new and more dangerous forms may result – or even
be intended.
If endorsed by the WHA, the intergovernmental encouragement of
the creation of designer disease will come at a particularly dangerous
time. Globally, the number of high containment facilities handling
dangerous disease agents is expanding and the hazardous applications
of biotechnology increasing. This is reflected in a growing number
of lab accidents in a variety of countries in recent years involving
highly pathogenic agents in high containment facilities. Particularly
in the US, the scope and quantity of research on biological weapons
agents is growing, and now exceeds the cost of the effort that
created the atomic bomb (the Manhattan Project), adjusted for
inflation.
Individuals and civil society organizations should take action
and voice their opposition to WHO and their national public health
authorities, urging them to reject the recommendations of the
committee and to instead ensure prompt destruction of all remaining
virus stocks. This briefing provides a political overview of smallpox
eradication, the WHO processes that led to the present state of
affairs, and related issues of biosafety and prohibitions on biological
weapons.