3.
section 3.10 |
Analysis of
submissions from
Interested Persons
appendix 2
Outcomes of Consultation: Submissions
from Interested Persons
Section contents
3.
Analysis of submissions from Interested
Persons
28
3.10 Liability issues
173
Introduction
173
Establishment of liability
174
Nature of the effects of genetic modification
174
Differing approaches to liability
175
Government responsibility
175
Government liability if genetic modification is not allowed
176
"Polluter-pays" approach to liability
176
Liability of beneficiaries
177
European decision on liability
177
Types of liability
178
Sources of liability
178
Categories of liability
179
Practical examples
179
Regulatory framework for liability
181
Necessity for specific liability provisions
181
Existing regulatory framework for liability
181
Adequacy of existing regulatory framework
182
Inadequacy of existing regulatory framework
183
Recommended changes to liability regulation
184
Liability insurance
184
Availability of liability insurance
184
New Zealand's position on liability insurance
185
International approaches to liability insurance
185
Report Appendix 2 | Royal Commission on Genetic Modification
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3.10 Liability issues
Introduction
The Warrant under item (e) called for information on:
the liability issues involved, or likely to be involved now or in the future, in relation to
the use, in New Zealand, of genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and
products
The issue of liability arises in relation to genetic modification as a result of
questions of liability regarding any adverse, or unintended effects from the use of
genetic modification technology.
Thirty-three submitters made substantive comment on the issue of liability. Of
these 33 submitters, the highest number were from the economic/productive
sector (15 submitters), followed by the environmental sector (seven submitters)
and the health sector (three submitters). Only two submissions were received from
groups with a cultural or ethical focus. The remaining six submitters were from
other sectors, such as governance.
The 33 submitters were from various types of organisations, with the most notable
being industry associations or networks (six submitters), followed by research
organisations (five submitters), advocacy networks (five submitters), private
companies (four submitters), consumer groups (four submitters), Maori groups
(four submitters) and the remaining submitters comprising government, organic
and "other" organisations. No religious organisations made substantive comment
on the issue of liability.
Of the 33 submitters offering comment on liability, the stance on genetic
modification was polarised, with a higher proportion taking a `strongly for' stance
(15 submitters) compared with those who were `strongly against' (eight submitters).
The remaining submitters were almost evenly distributed between the `tending to
be for', `neutral', or `tending to be against' stances on genetic modification.
The key themes on liability that were identified by submitters included:
*
establishment of liability
*
types of liability
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*
regulatory framework for liability
*
liability insurance.
Each of these themes is discussed below.
Establishment of liability
Submitters presented a range of views on how to establish liability and identify
liable parties. Comments on this theme covered these aspects:
*
nature of the effects of genetic modification
*
differing approaches to liability
*
government responsibility
*
government liability if genetic modification is not allowed
*
"polluter-pays" approach to liability
*
liability of beneficiaries
*
European decision on liability.
Nature of the effects of genetic modification
Submitters commented on the nature of the effects of genetic modification
activities that could pose problems in establishing liability. The principal difficulties
identified were that:
*
effects might be identified only in the longer term
*
effects might be diffuse
*
the extent of the effects might be difficult to establish.
Twelve submitters commented on the difficulties in establishing liability where the
impacts are diffuse or where the effects might take a long time to become evident.
Bio Dynamic Farming and Gardening Association in New Zealand [IP61]
commented that the law should provide for long periods of liability, such as 30
years after the event. Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment [IP70]
made the point that liability frameworks should be "ongoing in perpetuity" as
effects of genetic modification might become evident only in the long term.
Greenpeace New Zealand [IP82] and Safe Food Campaign [IP86] also commented
that liability that may eventuate from genetic modification could be hard to trace
and to attribute because of time delays.
Landcare Research [IP12] noted: "... risks and liabilities for use of GM products to
control wild populations of pests will be widely distributed in space ... Possums,
for example, occupy more than 95% of New Zealand."
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Bio Dynamic Farming and Gardening Association [IP61] commented on the
wide-ranging effects possible if genetically modified organisms were released into
the environment, when costs might be incurred by "innocent bystanders", such as
those "whose health is damaged such as by allergens" and those "whose livelihood
is damaged by contamination", such as organic, biodynamic and other farmers, as
well as "the public generally, where eradication or environmental degradation is
caused".
In addition, Safe Food Campaign [IP86] thought it was unlikely that any harm that
might eventuate from genetically modified foods or genetically modified organisms
could be traced back to the producer because of the complexity of the task. Friends
of the Earth (New Zealand) [IP78] raised the issue that liability might be
"incalculable" and stated:
It is possible that the nature and scale of the harm which could be caused by GM products
may be such that no amount of financial compensation or punitive action will undo the
damage.
Differing approaches to liability
Environmental Risk Management Authority (ERMA) [IP76] outlined two
philosophical approaches to liability, one where the state relieved people of the
liability of unexpected results ("socialisation of risk") and the other where the
operator must accept liability.
Nelson GE Free Awareness Group [IP100] was of the opinion that "at present we
have a situation in New Zealand where liability is neither assumed by the company,
or regulatory agency" and that the public was left to "pick up the bill" in the event
of any problems arising from genetic modification field trials. Public Questions
Committee (Methodist, Presbyterian, Churches of Christ, Quaker) [IP93]
commented that, where there was no certainty as to who would accept liability for
consequences, "importation of any products or processes that involve risks" should
be prohibited.
Government responsibility
Interchurch Commission on Genetic Engineering [IP49] noted that government
bodies that approved the use of genetically modified products, as well as those that
manufactured them, would be legally and financially responsible for "any adverse
effects, to individuals or to the environment, which result". Pacific Institute of
Resource Management [IP84] also noted that the "state should be originally
responsible and made liable for all activities carried out by private entrepreneurs"
and made comparisons with nuclear conventions where the state "bears ultimate
responsibility if the operator is unable to make full payment".
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Landcare Research [IP12] commented that the "liabilities associated with GM
products for pest control should fall on government as the primary user".
However, Eubios Ethics Institute [IP96] noted that unless government regulatory
authorities were found to be negligent for a known risk they should be exempt
from liability.
ERMA [IP76] noted that "if the Government wishes to be proactive in encouraging
innovation, then ... it may well decide to bear ... a large part of the risk".
Government liability if genetic modification is not
allowed
Several submitters raised the issue that Government might be exposed to some
level of liability if it decided not to allow genetic modification. New Zealand Life
Sciences Network [IP24] and Federated Farmers of New Zealand [IP34]
commented that there would be some liability on Government "should it decide to
stop what has hitherto been a legitimate commercial pursuit".
New Zealand Organisation for Rare Diseases [IP98] and New Zealand National
Commission for UNESCO [IP90] noted that Government could face liability
issues from the lack of use of beneficial genetic modification technology in the
health arena. Both of these submitters gave the example of the "significant claim"
against Government where it failed to introduce hepatitis C screening when first
internationally available. Auckland Healthcare Services [IP91] stated that if the use
of genetic modification technology was restricted in medical science then
"healthcare professionals are likely to find themselves in breach of a number of
consumer rights under the Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers'
Rights", such as rights to services that optimise quality of life and allow informed
choices.
"Polluter-pays" approach to liability
The philosophical approach to liability that the operator should bear responsibility
(also known as the "polluter-pays" approach) was presented by a range of
submitters. Thirteen submitters noted that there were difficulties in making the
polluter pay where there is contamination.
Meat Industry Association of New Zealand [IP32] commented that the "producer
of a product always remains liable for the failure of that product to be fit for
purpose" and did not think that would change with gene technology. Nelson GE
Free Awareness Group [IP100] concurred with this view, noting that "the onus
should rest on all companies to prove the safety of their products". Eubios Ethics
Institute [IP96] noted that the ethically responsible approach to liability is that the
polluter pays.
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The increasing emphasis in environmental legislation to impose a "polluter-
pays" regime was highlighted in the submission by Carter Holt Harvey/Fletcher
Challenge Forests [IP17] which also noted that experience with this approach to
contaminated sites had proved the difficulty of identifying the liable party. Friends
of the Earth [IP78] commented that in the short term liability should rest with
corporations that produce genetically modified products. Golden Bay Organic
Employment and Education Trust [IP104] was of the opinion that "the
biotechnology industry should be held 100 percent accountable for any harm
caused to people, the soil, the air, the water, ..." and that the use of genetic
modification should end until liability was fully established. Maori Congress
[IP103] summed up the polluter-pays position on liability with its comment that:
The worst case scenario is that we could be faced with the privatisation of our genetic
heritage - the corporate enclosure of our genetic commons - without the protection and
knowledge that the polluter­biopiracy agent must be liable.
Sustainable Futures Trust [IP51] noted that "we should not create a culture of non-
responsibility" with respect to genetic modification. Federation of Maori
Authorities [IP69] commented that liability for release of harmful organisms/
genetic material lay in the hands of the applicants responsible for the project. Bio
Dynamic Farming and Gardening Association [IP61] agreed that those who
released genetically modified organisms or intentionally used them should be held
liable for the effects, but noted that "this is insufficient protection, because it is
likely to be impossible to recall a genetically modified organism once it is
released".
Liability of beneficiaries
Several submitters, such as Green Party of Aotearoa/New Zealand [IP83] and
Pacific Institute of Resource Management [IP84], stated that those who benefited
from genetic modification should be prepared to reimburse costs to those
harmed. Maori Congress [IP103] noted that:
Should scientists wish to enjoy the benefits of their `discoveries' and to reap the riches
that intellectual property right patents may bring, they must also be prepared to deposit
sufficient security to pay liability should their research cause health or environmental
damage.
European decision on liability
Several submitters provided comment on a recent European decision where
producers of genetically modified plants were absolved from liability.
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Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment [IP70] and Sustainable
Futures Trust [IP51] cited a recent decision of the European Parliament that
ruled by 287 votes to 202 against legislation that producers of genetically
modified plants should be held legally responsible if the food products of these
plants turned out to be harmful to humans or the environment. Although this
legislation was voted down, Green Party [IP83] noted that the legislation "was
intended to safeguard organic farmers, as well as giving Europeans the power to
sue GM companies and force them to pay damages if they harmed health, the
environment or livelihoods".
Types of liability
Submitters described different sources of liability arising in relation to genetic
modification, as well as different categories of liability. They also provided some
practical examples of differing types of liability.
Sources of liability
Submitters suggested that sources of liability might include situations where work
involving genetic modification was not conducted in line with procedures, where
there was a lack of monitoring or a breach of regulations. Other sources of liability
noted by submitters included circumstances where the outcomes of genetic
modification applications were foreseeable, as well as situations where outcomes
were unexpected. New Zealand Dairy Board [IP67] identified two different types of
"harm" from genetic modification: one where the "harm" might be reasonably
foreseeable and the other where the "harm" might be entirely unanticipated. ERMA
[IP76] commented that dealing with unexpected effects is "problematic" and the
issue would be deciding how much risk Government would be willing to bear.
University of Canterbury [IP7] recognised two sources of liability: "those that
could result from the conduct [of] GE work; and those that could result from
inadequate monitoring of GE work overseas".
Association of Crown Research Institutes (ACRI) [IP22] noted that "where
procedures are not followed" liability might arise, for example "environmental
damage through the impacts of wild GM crops (or organisms) or through waste
from GM production". Dairy Board [IP67] commented further that under New
Zealand's existing laws "a person who causes damage (other than personal injury)
to others, [has] a liability to compensate the persons suffering that damage, under
the law of negligence or nuisance". In addition, the Board noted that, where
statutory controls existed for an activity, liability might arise if such duties were
breached.
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Both Meat New Zealand [IP31] and New Zealand Game Industry Board [IP33]
noted that "while potential liability resides in an escape or an unintentional
spread of an organism", the most significant liability associated with genetic
modification might be the potential for "loss" associated with New Zealand's
"key strategic genetic assets" and "depletion of our scientific resource base".
Categories of liability
AgResearch [IP13] differentiated liability according to legal liability and civil
liability, noting that there would be "legal liability for negligently allowing
dangerous or harmful organisms or effects to damage people or the environment"
and that "if a dangerous or harmful organism was released into the environment, it
could give rise to civil liability for nuisance or negligence". New Zealand Life
Sciences Network [IP24] identified two categories of liability, the first involving
"compensation for reduction or cessation of existing rights to research and develop
GM products" and the other comprising "civil liability for consequences of [a]
major incident involving GMOs".
AgResearch [IP13] and New Zealand Biotechnology Association [IP47] both
identified the potential for loss of public standing or professional credibility as a
form of liability in addition to legal liability and civil liability. Organic Product
Exporters Group (OPEG) [IP53] provided a practical example of this form of
liability noting that if organic products were "contaminated" by genetically
modified elements then this would result in "loss of the organic certification for
the product" and would lead to "a loss in the reputation of the company and the
company's brand value", as well as having a "negative impact on the whole New
Zealand organic sector's market reputation".
Practical examples
Submitters provided practical examples of situations where liability issues might
arise in relation to genetic modification. Environment and Conservation
Organisations of New Zealand [IP102] listed some of the current known liability
issues as:
*
Starlink corn
*
contaminated seeds in Europe
*
Monsanto prosecuting farmers for saving seed
*
BSE crisis in England.
Federated Farmers of New Zealand [IP34] noted that "liability may arise from an
event which has a health, safety or environmental impact, ... [it] may also arise
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from cross-pollination ... [or it] may become an issue when immediate steps are
not taken to adjust the regulatory regime in the event of new knowledge".
Meat Industry Association of New Zealand [IP32] commented that it faced
potential liability issues whenever it sold products and that liability issues "will
remain for any products that are based on gene technology". The Association also
highlighted the need for New Zealand to consider the liability implications of
"imported disease and pests and the risk of a `gm disaster'".
ACRI [IP22] and Nelson GE Free Awareness Group [IP100] noted that liability
might arise from the use of genetically modified products in the health arena. The
latter commented: "The liability issues arising from medical uses of genetic
engineering are immense and extremely varied." Haemophilia Foundation of New
Zealand [IP48] raised the issue that "past errors associated with HIV and HCV"
must not be "repeated with genetic technology in medicine" and suggested that a
service advisory group that contained people with clinical problems likely to be
impacted by genetic technologies should be set up to advise Government and
Ministry of Health.
Several submitters made comment on cross-boundary contamination issues with
respect to liability. Nga Wahine Tiaki o te Ao [IP64] stated that there was a "need
to be wary ... of cross contamination and infection of organic, clean crops and
species". Golden Bay Organic Employment and Education Trust [IP104]
commented that in the United States "genetic drift" was "one of the GM hot
potatoes that nobody wants" and that "there are no existing regulations to deal
with it". BIO-GRO New Zealand [IP58] also identified cross-boundary
contamination in its submission as a potentially serious liability issue. In an
accompanying witness brief, BIO-GRO noted:
With corn pollen able to travel up to six miles, it is difficult if not impossible to determine
who caused the contamination. Farmers are certainly not in the financial position to sue
everyone within six miles of their farm ... Cross pollination contamination opens the door
for potential legal problems because a farmer doesn't know who to go after.
OPEG [IP53] also acknowledged the "potential financial and other losses that
would arise from organic products and farms being contaminated by GM elements
and the liability issues associated with these events". In particular, OPEG noted
the potential for "loss of the ability to supply and access high value markets and the
possible collapse of the organic industry" and commented that "legal avenues for
compensation in such events are unclear".
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Regulatory framework for liability
Submitters presented a range of views on regulating for liability in relation to
genetic modification. Comments covered these aspects:
*
necessity for specific liability provisions
*
existing regulatory framework for liability
*
adequacy of existing regulatory framework
*
inadequacy of existing regulatory framework
*
recommended changes to liability regulation.
Necessity for specific liability provisions
Several submitters commented that no specific liability provisions are needed for
genetic modification. New Zealand Association of Scientists [IP92] noted that
liability should not be different for genetically modified and non-genetically
modified products and that "the issue of liability in relation to GM is fuelled by the
erroneous belief that GM products and organisms are inherently dangerous". New
Zealand Forest Research Institute [IP2] also commented that genetic modification
technology should not result in any organism with a greater magnitude of risk
compared with organisms produced by conventional breeding and that there was
"no recognised liability for users of forest trees derived from conventional
breeding". Monsanto New Zealand [IP6] concurred that liability for genetically
modified organisms "should be the same for GM and non-GM plants", and stated
that "there is no risk to GM plants that is specifically caused merely due to the fact
that they are produced through biotechnology".
Aventis CropScience [IP14] also considered that no specific liability regime was
justified for genetically modified organisms and cited the results of a global debate
of international expert groups in the framework of Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, Food and Agriculture Organization and World
Health Organization that concluded "products of modern biotechnology are not
more or less dangerous than their traditional counterparts". New Zealand
Biotechnology Association [IP47], Biotenz [IP25] and New Zealand Agritech
[IP73] all commented that there was no reason for genetically modified organism
technology to be treated differently from other technologies with respect to
liability.
Existing regulatory framework for liability
AgResearch [IP13] identified some of the key regulations for liability that were in
place under the existing Hazardous Substances and New Organisms (HSNO)
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legislation, including:
Section 109 of HSNO makes it an offence to knowingly import, release or possess a new
organism without the appropriate approval. It is also an offence to fail to comply with any
controls imposed by an approval. The penalty for any such offence is imprisonment for a
term not exceeding 3 months or a fine not exceeding $500,000 ...
It is an offence under section 109 HSNO for a manufacturer, developer or importer of a new
organism to knowingly fail to report any significant new information of any adverse effect
of that hazardous substance or new organism ... [this carries penalties] ...
... a Court may order the person who committed an offence against section 109 to mitigate
or remedy any adverse effects on people or the environment (section 114(5) HSNO). The
Court may also order that the new organism be destroyed (section 114(5) HSNO).
Meat New Zealand [IP31] and New Zealand Game Industry Board [IP33] also
noted that "the HSNO Act provides for significant penalties".
Researched Medicines Industry Association of New Zealand [IP55] noted that, in
addition to the HSNO legislation, New Zealand "has a variety of statutes, and the
law of negligence, under which product liability issues can be pursued".
Adequacy of existing regulatory framework
Fourteen submitters made comment that the existing liability laws were adequate
to deal with genetic modification. Forest Research Institute [IP2] stated that:
New Zealand has a very comprehensive procedure to assess and minimise risk associated
with genetic engineering. The HSNO Act specifies procedures for laboratories to follow to
minimise risk. Further, the Act provides measures to minimise risk related to contained
field trials of genetically engineered organisms.
ACRI [IP22] commented that "provided GM practitioners fulfil the obligations of
the HSNO Act and the ERMA requirements, the current liability framework will
be effective". Dairy Board [IP67] concurred that the existing law was adequate to
deal with "any reasonably foreseeable harm" from genetic modification and noted
"our law does not, and should not, seek to create a risk-free environment". New
Zealand Life Sciences Network [IP24] commented that the existing liability
regime which comprised "insurance contracts and law" was "sufficient to address
potential risks" of genetic modification. New Zealand Feed Manufacturers
Association/Poultry Industry Association of New Zealand/Egg Producers
Federation of New Zealand [IP35] considered that there was no liability "with GE
products that cannot be handled within New Zealand's current legislation", which
it identified as involving labelling through the Commerce Commission and
Australia New Zealand Food Authority (ANZFA), and safety through ERMA and
the HSNO Act.
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Inadequacy of existing regulatory framework
Sixteen submitters considered that the current liability law was not adequate with
respect to genetic modification. Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment
[IP70] stated: "Liability issues are not resolved in New Zealand and are an
important consideration in developing a strategic approach to GM technologies in
New Zealand."
Greenpeace [IP82] and Green Party of Aotearoa/New Zealand [IP83] did not
consider New Zealand's current liability regime to be adequate to deal with
genetically modified organisms. Greenpeace commented: "Liability regimes are
not equipped to redress the kind of damages wrought by the irreversible release of
genetically modified organisms."
Dairy Board [IP67] considered that New Zealand's existing laws were not adequate
in terms of liability "where damage is not reasonably foreseeable" and stated:
The existing law does not necessarily provide a mechanism for transferring risks which are
unforeseeable, from the persons suffering damage if it does occur to the persons obtaining
the benefits of the technology.
However, the Board noted further that if laws were modified so as "to impose
absolute liability on any person using GM technology for any harm, foreseeable or
not", then the benefits of genetic modification might be lost "for fear of risks
which will probably never happen". Therefore, it suggested that existing laws
should not be changed but that appropriate risk management controls for genetic
modification be adopted.
Federated Farmers of New Zealand [IP34] put forward a range of measures to
control liability from unintended outcomes that did not include changes to the
existing regulatory regime. These measures included: "working within legislative
guidelines under HSNO", "adopting industry quality assurance programmes",
"using trained and registered operators where appropriate", "applying
comprehensive communication regimes" and "purchase of commercial insurance".
Greenpeace [IP82] considered "monitoring and absolute liability regimes will
need to be established to address illegal importation of genetically engineered
organisms or accidental contamination of imports". Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu
[IP41] also made comment that "the issues of liability prove that monitoring has
not been adequately addressed". Royal Society of New Zealand [IP77] cautioned
against stringent legislative regimes noting:
One argument against this sort of intensive regulation and legislation is that it will
infringe on the individual liberties of farmers who want to gain a competitive advantage
by using GM products. However, given the `unknowns' surrounding GM, it seems only just
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that those who are not gaining financially from the products are protected from any
possible adverse events.
Physicians and Scientists for Responsible Genetics New Zealand (PSRG) [IP107]
noted "ERMA is inadequate to police this industry" and provided examples of
transgressions in New Zealand in relation to genetic modification.
Recommended changes to liability regulation
Changes to liability regulation for genetic modification were recommended by
several submitters. Pacific Institute of Resource Management [IP84] raised the
issue that "liability and compensation clauses should be incorporated in any
legislation relating to the use of gene technology as the risk of harm ... is
transnational in character and major in degree". Nelson GE Free Awareness
Group [IP100] commented that "the public cannot be fully protected unless [there
are] strict rulings covering liability issues" and suggested that "liability funds" such
as those implemented in Spain be set up. Canterbury Commercial Organics
Group [IP65] stated that:
The Royal Commission ... has a responsibility to establish full liability to companies
developing GE technologies for economic and other losses caused by genetic drift and
other environmental effects created through genetic engineering.
ERMA [IP76] made the point that there "is merit in having ... a bond to cover the
clean-up of adverse effects" and likened this proposal to provisions provided in the
Resource Management Act 1991. The need for clarity as to who would meet the
costs of unintended effects or accidents was a concern noted by Parliamentary
Commissioner for the Environment [IP70].
Liability insurance
Another theme of the submissions was that of liability insurance in relation to
genetic modification. Submitters commented on: availability of liability insurance,
New Zealand's position on liability insurance and international approaches to
liability insurance.
Availability of liability insurance
Several submitters, principally those from environmental organisations, raised the
issue of liability insurance in relation to genetic modification. The key issue raised
was that "problems" arising from genetic modification activities might be too great
to be covered by liability insurance.
Friends of the Earth [IP78] made comment that there was a "strong possibility that
liability insurance will not be available to manufacturers of GM products". Safe
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Food Campaign [IP86] noted further that "scientific uncertainty surrounding
[genetic modification] and the threat of serious and irreversible harm ... defies
liability concepts of bonds or insurance".
Greenpeace [IP82] also raised the issues that "society cannot simply rely on
insurance to cover all risks" and that genetically engineered products "could cause
such enormous insurance problems" that "insurance companies cannot be relied
upon to shoulder the burden". PSRG [IP107] supported this view and made the
point that "hazards" arising from genetic modification may not be able to be
quantified and therefore not insured, stating:
No insurance companies will provide indemnity against the eventuality of harm arising
from a genetically engineered organism. This is because the potential hazards cannot be
assessed let alone quantified.
New Zealand's position on liability insurance
ERMA [IP76] commented that public liability insurance "to date has been ... at
the discretion of the approval holder" and that taking out a bond or public liability
insurance could be regarded as an unnecessary compliance cost. Parliamentary
Commissioner for the Environment [IP70] noted that "the insurance industry in
New Zealand does not yet have an official position on issues involving genetically
modified organisms in the environment" but also added comment from an
insurance industry spokesperson that "there is a general feeling amongst the
industry that the risks involved with GMOs in the environment are just too great
for insurance companies to accept". Nelson GE Free Awareness Group [IP100]
also noted "insurance companies have refused to insure genetically engineered
crops".
International approaches to liability insurance
Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment [IP70] and Greenpeace [IP82]
outlined several international approaches to liability insurance.
Greenpeace [IP82] noted the Insurance Council of Australia's position on insuring
genetic modification, which was that "general insurers are reluctant to accept
incalculable risks where it is difficult to predict what loss scenarios will arise".
Greenpeace also mentioned the comments of Swiss Re, an "influential" European
re-insurance company, which regarded genetic engineering as one of the most
"exposed technologies of the future". Parliamentary Commissioner for the
Environment [IP70] made comment on the insurance position in the United
States where "the insurance industry has consistently refused to write policies
covering liability for harm caused by genetically modified organisms".